ON COMBINING CLAUSES AND ACTIONS IN INTERACTION

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Let me begin by saying how pleased I am to have become part of the research community in and with the Finnish Department at the University of Helsinki. Finland is known internationally in my field for having more conversation analysts per capita than any other country in the world, which makes it a very desirable place to be from my perspective. It is also a center of research into language and interaction, with seminal work having been done here, among other things, on particles, on case and person marking, and on clause combining in everyday conversation and institutional interaction. I am honored and proud to be joining this impressive community of scholars, who view language as a living object to be studied in vivo (e.g. on the street) not in vitro (e.g. in the lab or even in an armchair), who view language as a product which emerges in discourse and serves as a resource for social action and interaction in the lives of real speakers.

In talking about »combining clauses and actions in interaction« I hope to demonstrate one way in which language relates to interaction and vice versa, in which interaction relates to language. My topic is a challenging one, because there are so many ways in which we as speakers combine
Clauses and actions in conversation. I will only be talking about selected cases, which I will treat as exemplary for all the rest. My data will be exclusively from English conversation, although the phenomena I am talking about are of course also found in other languages and cultures.

I will proceed by first explaining what I mean by clause and action and then briefly reviewing some of the ways in which speakers link clauses and interactants link actions. I will then argue that there are alternative clause-combination forms which speakers use for linking actions (some crucially involving prosody) and finally consider the question of which clause-combination forms speakers/interactants choose when. In contrast to much prior research on ‘connectors’ in clause combining, my approach starts from actions and incorporates the prosodic dimension of language use.

CLAUSES AND ACTIONS

What is a clause? By »clause« I mean a particular type of grammatical structure, typically one that in English has both an explicit subject and an explicit predicate (see also Thompson & Couper-Kuhlen 2005). Let’s look at some actual cases in English conversation. This is the transcript of a conversation which took place late at night between a couple, Steffie and Oliver, who are about to record their pillow talk for the purpose of interactional linguistic research. Steffie is filling in the permission form, which asks for the speakers’ names and their codes, i.e. their nicknames. Oliver, who is reading over her shoulder, asks in a mock alarmed tone of voice »Speakers have like codes?« He is concerned that the recording may be misused for intelligence purposes. This is where we join the conversation.

(1) Speaker codes (AD: Night vision)

Steffie and Oliver are lying in bed at night before going to sleep. In this fragment Steffie is filling in the permission form for the recording and Oliver is reading over her shoulder.

1 OLI: speakers have like CODES?
2   (11.9)
3 OLI: <GOD! .hhh> <stage whisper>
4   (0.3)
5 STE: <<f> (wha-/wel-) it’s im[PORtant.>
6 OLI:  [<<pp> DO::cuments (     )>
7   <<p> huh!>
8 STE: you don’t think Anything’s im|portant
9 OLI: [it’s W:EL:RD!
10   (1.0)
11 STE: it’s not W:E|RD;
12 it’s what- it’s NE|cessary.
13 it’s SClence.
Among the clauses here are: speakers have like codes (l. 1), it’s important (l. 5), it’s weird (l. 9), it’s not weird (l. 11), it’s necessary (l. 12) and it’s science (l. 13). But the following are not clauses: God! (l. 3), documents (l. 6) and huh! (l. 7).

The latter are words (or phrases) and so-called sound objects (Reber 2008). These are also utterances which build turns at talk, but they are not full clauses.

What is an action? By »action« I refer to what speakers do with the words they use to take a turn-at-talk. In verbal interaction, turns-at-talk consist of at least one turn-constructional unit. A turn-constructional unit is a word, phrase or clause which in and of itself implements an action. Turn-constructional units are the building blocks of turns (Schegloff 2007). In fragment (1), for instance, when Steffie says in line 5 it’s important, this is a turn-constructional unit. She is assessing the permission form and the research that it will enable. This is the action her words are implementing. When Oliver says in line 9 it’s weird! this is also a turn-constructional unit. The action behind these words is to assess what is on the permission form, namely a set of blanks for »speaker codes» and a reference to »documents».

But a turn-at-talk can consist of more than one turn-constructional unit and consequently of more than one action. When this happens, we speak of a multi-unit turn. We find such a case here in lines 11–13. Steffie first denies Oliver’s assessment that the permission form is weird and then provides a more correct assessment of her own. Her denial works to disagree with Oliver’s prior judgment, just as her own subsequent assessment provides an account for why she disagrees: it’s not weird; it’s what-it’s necessary (l. 11–12). She then goes on to account for her own assessment of the permission form as necessary: it’s science. (l. 13). We’ll see more of such complex, multi-unit turns later.

My lecture today will be concerned with the relation between clause and action, and in particular with the linkage of clauses and the linkage of actions. I will be focussing on one particular type of relation between linked clauses and linked actions, two clauses implementing two actions:

[clause + clause] → [action + action]

This is the case when two clauses are combined and together implement two linked actions. I propose to approach the phenomenon in vivo. That is, I want to look at those occasions when this actually happens in mundane talk-in-interaction, i.e. when real speakers are talking to each other under ordinary circumstances, either face-to-face or via the telephone. I will be using audio and video data collected – with the permission of the interactants – on just such occasions. And I will be asking:

1. What means do speakers use to link the clauses in question?
2. What linked actions are the interactants realizing?
3. Why do the speakers/interactants choose to link their actions in the way they do?

HOW DO SPEAKERS LINK CLAUSES?

What ways do speakers have of combining clauses? There is a broad spectrum of ways in which clauses can be combined in language. I will give a brief overview here of two of the most important types of clause combining, using examples from English. These types of clause combining, however, can be found in many other languages.
I. Adverbial subordination: a dependent clause can be adjoined to an independent one, typically in an adverbial or circumstantial relation. For instance, the adverbial clause can express time, cause, condition, concession, purpose, etc. with respect to the main clause. English has words which are dedicated to marking this kind of dependent relation: subordinating conjunctions such as, because, if, although, etc. For example:

[he wouldn’t eat her lunch,] [because she wanted dessert]
[if you invite them,] [you’ll also have to invite Liza and Antonio]
[last week’s (show) wasn’t shown,] [even though it was supposed to be number one]

As can be seen from these examples, the adverbial subordinate clause can appear either before or after the main clause in English.

II. Coordination: two or more independent clauses can be connected to one another, typically in an additive, adversative or disjunctive relation. English has words which are dedicated to doing this: the coordinating conjunctions and, but, or. For example:

[we showed up there] and [they were all gone]
[that’s a possibility] but [Jake will block it]

Adverbial subordination and coordination are two well-known ways that the grammar of language (understood as lexico-syntax) provides for clause combinations. I might add that these are the ones recognized by canonical grammars, which are usually based on the written language. However, when we broaden our perspective to include grammar as instantiated in naturally occurring conversation, we discover that speakers have even more ways of combining clauses. For instance:

III. Prosodic and phonetic linkage:
Two adjacent clauses can be made to cohere through prosodic means. This can happen if, for instance, features of pitch, loudness, timing and articulation/phonation at the beginning of the second clause are adjusted to match those at the end of the first clause. This kind of prosodic and phonetic matching of a second unit to a first creates prosodic cohesion between the two clauses. It may or may not co-occur with explicit lexico-syntactic marks of combining. Let’s return to Example (1) and see a case where the only formal mark of linkage is in the prosody:

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1 These examples are all taken from the Santa Barbara Corpus of Spoken American English (Du Bois et al 2000-2005).
2 These examples also come from the Santa Barbara Corpus of Spoken American English (Du Bois et al 2000-2005).
Steffie and Oliver are lying in bed at night before going to sleep. In this passage Steffie is filling in the permission form for the recording and Oliver is reading over her shoulder.

If you listen carefully to the pitch at the beginning of the clause in line 13, you will hear that it is adjusted to match the pitch at the end of the clause in line 12. We can get a visual representation of this with the graphical representation shown in Figure 1, made with the computerized speech analysis program Praat (http://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/praat). This diagram shows the waveform at the top and the fundamental frequency, i.e. roughly what the pitch of the voice is doing, in the middle. Both the waveform and the fundamental frequency (calibrated in Hertz) are aligned with the words being spoken, which are shown at the bottom of the diagram.

Figure 1. Praat diagram of lines 12–13 in Example (1).
We can see the pitch adjustment by comparing the way each of the two clauses begins. Whereas the first token it's is delivered at more than 230 Hz, the second is produced at approx. 165 Hz, much closer to the pitch level at the end of necessary, which is approx. 174 Hz. This, together with the regular rhythmic delivery of the two clauses, contributes to the impression that the two clauses are linked to one another, an impression which is underlined by their parallel syntactic structure. If they weren’t linked prosodically, the delivery of these two clauses would make them sound like: ↑ it’s necessary. ↑ it’s science.

WHEN DO INTERACTANTS LINK ACTIONS?

Let me now put on my other hat and talk briefly about when participants in social interaction need to accomplish more than one action in a turn-at-talk. This involves turn-taking. The first thing to remember about turn-taking is that in mundane conversation the default case is for a speaker to produce one single turn-constructional unit, i.e. launch only one action at a time, and then give the floor to the next speaker. Speakers who wish to continue beyond a first turn-constructional unit, i.e. implement more than one action at a time, must exert special effort in order to do so. The result is therefore an achievement, in the sense that it requires work and things could happen differently. Schegloff writes in this respect:

…at least in conversation, discourse must be treated as an achievement. There is a real, recurrent contingency concerning ‘who should talk now’; the fact that someone continues is an outcome coordinately achieved out of that contingency… (1982: 89).

Yet despite the extra work involved, it does happen that speakers produce extended turns with two or more actions in them. When? We don’t yet have an exhaustive list of all the occasions which call for this kind of multi-unit turn construction, but I will list a few here which I and others have encountered in our research.

REJECTION (NEGATIVE RESPONSE) + ACCOUNT

If a request, offer, invitation or proposal is made but the recipient finds that they need to turn down, decline, refuse or reject what is being offered or requested, then they may do so but go on to provide a reason or explanation for why they are doing so. Here’s a case where this happens:

(2) Granny coming (Holt X Christmas 2:1:4)

Leslie’s daughter Katherine, who is at college in the north, is making plans to return home for a Christmas visit. When she comes home, she will need to be picked up at the station.

1 Les: [anyway when do you think you’d like to come home ↓ love.
2 ()
3 Kat: uh:m (.) well brad’s going down on monday.
4 (0.7)
5 → Les: monday we’ll ah-hh (.) hh w: ↑ monday we can’t manage becuz
6 → (.) granny’s ↓ coming monday. ↓
7 (0.4)
8 Kat: oh:
9 (0.5)
The proposal here is in line 3: by answering her mother’s question this way, Katherine implies that she would like to come down with her boyfriend on Monday. Both know that this will entail her parents picking her up from the station. Leslie, however, turns down the proposal: Monday we can’t manage (line 5), but goes on to extend her turn by adding a reason: Granny’s coming Monday. The linkage between Leslie’s refusal and her explanation is explicitly marked by the subordinating conjunction because.

Table 1. Clause and action combination in example (2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clause</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Marker of linkage</th>
<th>2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monday we can’t</td>
<td>Rejection (negative response)</td>
<td>becuz (.)</td>
<td>Granny’s coming Monday.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Weak agreement + Disagreement

When an interactant assesses some commonly experienced object or event, recipients may find themselves in the position of not fully agreeing. In this case, however, they may provide a weak agreement first before going on to express their disagreement. Here’s a case in point:

(3) Realistic art (Pomerantz 1984:78)

A is asking D to assess her newly acquired print.

1  A: D’you like it?
2  D: .hhh Yes I do like it=
3  although I really::= ((23 lines omitted))
27 D: .hhh Well I don’t- I’m not a great fan of this type of art. There are certain- ones I see that I like.
29  But I like the w- [more realistic- ((5 lines omitted))
35 D: You d-know why I don’t go for this type of uh:: art,
36 Becuz it- it strikes me as being the magazine
37 adverti:sement ty:pe.
38 Which some uh-uh some of them are really great.
39 But uh I-my taste in art is for the more uh::
40 it-t-treh- it tends to be realistic.

Since this is A’s newly acquired print, it is clear that she has a high opinion of it. Yet D in line 2, when asked for her opinion, is in the position of not fully agreeing with A’s implicit positive evaluation. However, D first says I do like it before going on to say although I really…, which she breaks off. She then resumes her evaluation of the print several lines later when she says I’m not a great fan of this type of art (line 27-8) and I like the more realistic (line 29), once again broken off. In lines 39-40 her disagreement again becomes explicit, when she says my taste in art is for the more, it tends to be realistic. Thus, although D’s initial turn component although I really is broken off (line 3), there are grounds for believing that had it been completed, it would have been approximately the equivalent of ‘although I really like the more realistic type’.3

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3 D’s turn in lines 2–3 is thus, strictly speaking, only an aborted clause combination, although this is clearly an action combination.
Table 2. Clause and action combination in example (3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clause</th>
<th>Marker of linkage</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I do like it</td>
<td><strong>although</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>I really (like the more realistic type)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**BACKGROUND CONDITION + DIRECTIVE**

When interactants wish to ask their interlocutor to perform some specific task, they may specify that they are only asking if certain background conditions hold. If these conditions don’t hold, then the request is not relevant. This has the advantage that if the desired action doesn’t happen, it could appear to be because the conditions didn’t hold, rather than because the directive was refused.

Example (4)

(4) Dorothy Alexander (sbl 015)

```
1 Cla:  hhh Okay hh Uh do you wanna do me a favor and
2   →  if you have time
3   →  ca::ll uh hhh Dorothy Al:exander for me
4   →  and ask her if she wants to go::?
5 Jo:   O[kay if s]h[e
6 Cla:   [hh hhhh] [I tried to get her but uh:: th-the li:ne was
7       bus[y.
8 Jo:   [Yeh. Ah ha ]ho
9 Cla:   [ t hhhhh]h
10 Jo:    [We:ll I'll I'll try to get her,
```

Here the request which Clacia makes (lines 3–4) — namely, that her friend Jo should call Dorothy Alexander and ask her if she wants to go — is made only for the case in which Jo has the time (line 2). Otherwise, the request is irrelevant.

Table 3. Clause and action combination in example (4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clause</th>
<th>Marker of linkage</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>if you have time</td>
<td><strong>call Dorothy Alexander for me and ask her if she wants to go</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These are all situations in which speakers are more likely than not to build turns with at least two actions in them. You may have noticed that the occasions all involve rather delicate matters, ones which put social solidarity momentarily at risk: rejecting, disagreeing, requesting. It may not be a coincidence that it is precisely for this kind of work that interactants link explanations, mitigations and conditions to actions which might potentially threaten their face or that of their interlocutor. And as my tables show, in the cases presented, speakers use clause combinations to carry out these linked actions. The ones I have shown involve a causal relation (expressed by because), a
concessive relation (expressed by *although*) and a conditional relation (expressed by *if*) between the two clauses, respectively.

**ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF CLAUSAL LINKAGE FOR ACTION LINKAGE**

Now the astute listener may have noticed that all the examples so far have been cases in which there is a lexico-syntactic mark of clause combination, and indeed one which is dedicated to expressing the relation in question: *because, although, if*. However, each of these types of linked action can also be accomplished in more implicit ways, i.e. by forms which mark the type of linkage less explicitly, or indeed which do not mark the linkage at all. In many cases it is such non-explicit marking which is more common.

**Rejection (negative response) + account**

(5) Rob (Chicken Dinner 12)

Shane and his girlfriend Vivian have been talking about Shane’s roommate Rob, who Shane has just described as «an asshole». Vivian objects that this judgment is not quite fair, since Michael and Nancy haven’t met Rob yet. Michael and Nancy now assure her that they have.

```
1 MIC: W[ell I met Rob,]
2 VIV: [Have you met him?]  
3 MIC: I met him,  
4 SHA: No he’s a nice guy he’s[just s[orta dumb. ]  
5 MIC: [I’ve talked to]him on the  
6 NAN: phone.  
7 MIC: [(Yeah)
8 9 (0.4)
10 SHA: ( [   ).  
11 VIV: [Oh when you were over he was ho:me?  
12 MIC: Hm-hm?  
13 (1.0)
14 VIV: So what did you thi:kn.  
15 (2.2)
16 SHA: pwehh ?hh  
17 MIC: I don’t know=I couldn’t (1.4)  
18 → I didn’t really get to talk to him that much uh-  
19 → I can’t say.
```
A request for information is made here in line 14 when Vivian asks Michael what he thought of Rob. Michael, however, declines to provide the requested information when he says *I don’t know* (line 17). But he doesn’t leave it at that. Instead he goes on to explain why he can’t say anything with *I didn’t really get to talk to him that much* (line 18). This is an account for his refusal.

**Table 4.** Clause and action combination in Example (5).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clause</td>
<td><em>I don’t know</em> = <em>I couldn’t (say)</em></td>
<td><em>I didn’t really get to talk to him that much.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action</td>
<td>Rejection (negative response)</td>
<td>Account</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notice that these two actions are not linked explicitly. In fact, there is no lexico-syntactic sign of their linkage at all. But the two parts are linked prosodically. For one, the pitch at the beginning of the second full clause (approx. 132 Hz) is lower than that at the beginning of the first full clause (approx. 151 Hz). Second, the two parts are linked rather literally in that the speaker holds his breath from the end of *I couldn’t* over the intervening 1.4 second pause until the beginning of the second full clause, when it is released again. Figure 2 shows a graphical representation of the prosody in this turn.

![Figure 2. Praat diagram of lines 17–18 in Example (5).](image)

*I couldn’t* in line 17 is likely to be an aborted form of *I couldn’t say* (see line 19).
WEAK AGREEMENT + DISAGREEMENT

(6) Sense of humor (Pomerantz 1984: 71)

1  A:  (     ) cause those things take working at,
2      (2.0)
3  B:  (hhhhh) well, they [do, but
4  A:  [They aren’t accidents,
5  B:  No, they take working at,
6  But on the other hand, some people are born with uhm (1.0)
7    well a sense of humor,
8  I think is something you’re born with Bea.
9  A:  Yes. Or it’s c- I have the- eh yes.
10  →  I think a lotta people are,
11  →  but then I think it can be developed, too.
12   (1.0)
13  B:  Yeh, but [there’s-
14  A:  [Any-
15  A:  Any of those attributes can be developed.

In this fragment B makes a positive assessment about a sense of humor, namely that it is something you’re born with (line 8). But her recipient A doesn’t fully agree. Yet she first produces a weak, pro-forma agreement in line 10 I think a lotta people are and only then goes on to state her disagreement I think it can be developed too (line 11). These two clauses are linked by but then. Now the conjunction but doesn’t explicitly express a concessive relation. It doesn’t say »I acknowledge that what you have said is true, yet I nevertheless think that my view is the right one«. Instead it merely indicates some kind of contrast. In addition, it is accompanied by then, which is traditionally thought of as a temporal marker. So the concessive meaning here is not signalled explicitly by the words used, although the two clauses are marked as being linked to one another.5

Table 5. Clause and action combination in Example (6).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clause</th>
<th>Marker of linkage</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I think a lotta people are</td>
<td>but then</td>
<td>Weak agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I think it can be developed too</td>
<td></td>
<td>Disagreement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5 More data would be needed to determine whether there are grounds for saying that but then is in the process of grammaticizing/lexicalizing into a marker of concession.
Alina has been complaining bitterly about her niece Cassandra, who she considers to be obnoxious and ill-bred. In this episode she is recounting what happened on Cassandra’s most recent visit to her house. Cassandra tried to go out on the balcony, although Alina didn’t want her to do this.

Table 6. Clause and action combination in Example (7).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clause</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>you wanna go outside?</td>
<td>Background condition</td>
<td>you go downstairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action</td>
<td>Background condition</td>
<td>Directive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that there is no lexico-syntactic marker at all of the linkage between these two clauses, although they are tied to one another prosodically, as can be seen in Figure 3.

Notice how the initial pitch of you go downstairs follows on from the rise on you wanna go outside. For cases in which there is no explicit mark of linkage at all, it appears to be prosodic and phonetic cues which facilitate an interpretation of the adjacent clauses as being in combination with one another.

Yet if there is no explicit mark of the type of linkage between two clauses, or only a very general marker such as but, how do interactants know to interpret the combinations as causal, concessive and conditional, respectively? Compare, for instance, the unmarked combinations:

(5) I don’t know=I couldn’t (say). I didn’t really get to talk to him that much.
(7) you wanna go outside? you go downstairs.
How do participants know that *I didn’t really get to talk to him that much* in (5) is an account and not a telling (i.e., part of a story)? How do participants know in (7) that *you wanna go outside?* is not just an innocent question but a condition and that only if it holds is the following directive a relevant one? The answer lies presumably in what kind of activity is going on and in what sequential position these clauses occur, i.e. what comes before and/or after them. If the situation is one in which refusing or requesting is going on, then our experience tells us that these activities are likely to be accompanied by accounts (causal linkage) and conditions (conditional linkage). Such expectations encourage us to interpret the actions as combined in precisely these ways.

Finally, consider the inexplicitly marked combination in example 6:

(6) I think a lotta people are, but then I think it can be developed, too.

How do participants know to interpret *I think it can be developed, too* in (6) as a disagreement rather than as an agreement? The answer appears to be that the linkage with *but* implies a contrast with what has gone before. Yet exactly how the contrast plays out concretely depends on what action the prior clause is understood to be implementing. If it is a weak agreement, then what follows is a disagreement. Here too, it appears to be normative expectations about what actions go together in social interaction that create a structural frame for the interpretation of unmarked and inexplicitly marked clause combinations.

Figure 3. Praat diagram of lines 7–8 in Example (7).
WHICH FORMS DO SPEAKERS CHOOSE TO LINK ACTIONS AND WHY?

A comparison of examples (2)–(4) and (5)–(7) shows that there are alternative forms for one and the same type of action linkage:

Table 7. Comparison of clause combinations in Examples (2)–(7).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clause combination</th>
<th>Semantic relation</th>
<th>Explicitly marked</th>
<th>Inexplicitly marked or unmarked</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Action linkage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rejection (negative response) + account</td>
<td>Causal</td>
<td>Monday we can’t manage becuz Granny’s coming Monday</td>
<td>I don’t know=I couldn’t (say). I didn’t really get to talk to him that much</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak agreement + disagreement</td>
<td>Concessive</td>
<td>I do like it although I really (like the more realistic type)</td>
<td>I think a lotta people are (born with a sense of humor) but then I think it can be developed too</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background condition + directive</td>
<td>Conditional</td>
<td>if you have time call Dorothy Alexander for me and ask her if she wants to go</td>
<td>you wanna go outside? you go downstairs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

So what determines speakers’ formal choices for implementing these linked actions? There is no simple answer to this question. In fact, there seem to be different factors involved for each of the relations — causal, concessive and conditional. Preliminary findings indicate that causal relations — or in action terms, accounts following rejections and negative responses — are often expressed without explicit marking in English (cf. Ford 2001, 2002). Studies of concessive relations — i.e. weak agreements and the like — in English conversation have shown that these are routinely expressed inexplicitly with but (Barth 2000, Couper-Kuhlen & Thompson 2000). However, conditional relations — e.g. those accompanying requests or directives — appear to be more often expressed explicitly in English with if than in an unmarked or inexplicit fashion (cf. Ford 1993, Thumm 2000).

Table 8. Frequency estimates for clause combination types.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clause combination</th>
<th>Explicitly marked</th>
<th>Inexplicitly marked</th>
<th>Unmarked</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Semantic relationship</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concessive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Why this should be the case is a matter for further investigation, as is the question of whether the same holds for other languages. This is the type of research question which I hope to be able to pursue during my stay here in Helsinki, together with colleagues from the language departments, the department of sociology, the department of speech sciences and the Research Institute for the Languages of Finland. I am excited at the prospect of moving beyond the single clause and the single action or turn-constructional unit to start thinking about clause combinations and multi-unit turns with you. With a common perspective on language as a resource for social interaction and adopting the methodological principle of *in vivo* analysis, I am sure that we have much to discover together!

SELECTED REFERENCES

**Barth, Dagmar** 2000: »that’s true, although not really, but still... »: Concessive relations in spoken English discourse. – Elizabeth Couper-Kuhlen & Bernd Kortmann (eds.) *Cause, condition, concession and contrast: Cognitive and discourse perspectives* p. 411–438. Berlin: de Gruyter.


